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Globalization has changed our worlds domestically and beyond the nation-
state. Our societies are facing opportunities and risks. It depends not at 
least on political action what will prevail. Three major factors will be de-
cisive for social and political cohesion in our advanced democratic societies, 
but they can be changed and are not set in concrete. They are the essential 
screws for knocking politics into shape.
• Class: socio-economic inequality
• Culture, religion, ethnicity: cultural heterogeneity
• Cosmopolitan elites and communitarian citizens: which engagement?
All three variables can be separated out analytically but, in reality, they are 
very closely woven together, they overlap and buttress each other. If there’s 
any mismatch then they may become deactivated; if they overlap then 
conflicts mount and the problems of integration intensify. Theoretical con-
siderations as well as empirical facts suggest the following basic hypoth-
esis: intelligent political action can create the social and cultural pre-con-
ditions for successful societal integration and political engagement in 
liberal democracies. But to do so you must put to one side the postmodern 
naivety of multi-cultural and cosmopolitan optimism and to accept the 
empirically proven fact that it’s harder to govern heterogeneous societies 
than homogeneous ones. What IS and what SHOULD BE the case must not 
be mixed up in any sober analysis.
1. Social class and socio-economic inequality
From the beginning of the 1980s inequality of income and wealth rose in 
the OECD club of economies regardless of the indicator used: Gini-index, 
upper and lower quintile, decile, poverty ratio or especially the top 1.0 or 
0.1% of the income pyramid (cf. inter alia Piketty 2014). This steep rise in 
inequality is not the ‘natural’ consequence of the digital revolution, the 
knowledge economy or bold creative disruption. Mainly, it’s a result of po-
litical decisions that have been propagating this particular form of market 
empowerment and the shrinking of the state for pretty well three decades.
At the same time, the OECD group of countries is witnessing lower turnouts 
at elections as well as declining membership of political parties and larger 
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collective bodies in society. The lower third of society in particular has 
turned its back on politics. New or direct forms of political participation 
such as NGOs, referenda, citizen councils and participatory budgeting or 
deliberative fora are socially much more selective than the ailing institu-
tions of representative democracy. The participatory world of the OECD 
has witnessed the emergence of two-thirds democracies. The lower third 
has broken away from political engagement and our democracies.
Democracy lives on assumptions that cannot be reproduced by economy 
and society alone. This is not a structural fault of democracy. Rather, we are 
dealing with a partially deliberate, partially careless surrender of the state’s 
capacity to regulate and intervene in an economy that structurally creates 
socio-economic inequality and erodes the fundamental democratic principle 
of political equality. So the issue is to strengthen the state and reboot much 
more strongly redistribution as a general leitmotiv within fiscal, economic 
and education policy. The more socially just the more integrated a society 
and, with that, the higher the quality of democracy. Social equality, societal 
integration, and political engagement by the people are closely connected.
2. Governing Heterogeneous Societies
Culturally homogeneous societies are easier to govern. Heterogeneous 
societies tend to draw ethnic cleavages, to fragment into sub-cultures, to 
create parallel societies and cut back on the build-up of inclusive social 
capital. That sounds alarming because heterogeneous societies are our 
future and many aspects of them can be exceedingly positive, such as cul-
tural diversity, economic and social creativity as well as the practice of 
tolerance and recognition of the other.
Empirical research can demonstrate the following about social capital: the 
greater the socio-economic and ethno-religious inequality the lower the 
level of mutual trust among citizens. This link is not unavoidable but it can 
be mitigated – including via: economic growth, meritocratic mechanisms 
in society (equal life chances: Amartya Sen), social security, fair rules of 
redistribution beyond the markets, low levels of social inequality, and strong 
social links between ethnic communities (bridging social capital).
The negative scenario in our society would be: no growth, high economic 
inequality, a weak welfare state, high levels of ethnic diversity with, at the 
same time, barely any cross-ethnic community social organizations. This 
has been the path followed in the last three decades. But turn these around 
and there’s a positive integration scenario.
The removal of socio-economic inequality in a prosperous economy could 
unleash a special pro-integration dynamic that, over the long term, could 
help bridge not only economic, but also cultural gaps. Right now, there’s 
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the risk of a cleavage becoming starker between Arab Muslims and European 
immigration societies whether these are laicistic like France, or liberal-
multicultural like Holland, or Catholic like Poland and Slovakia. Today’s 
Europe demonstrates barely a successful example of Muslim integration: 
neither of Arab Muslims in France, Belgium, Holland, Spain nor of Turkish 
Muslims in Germany, Switzerland and Austria nor again of Pakistani Muslims 
in Great Britain. One cause of this is certainly a failed policy of integration. 
The immigration country did not take their engagements connected to 
immigration and necessary for integration sufficiently serious.
But is that all? Have all countries simply failed? The liberal multi-cultural 
policies in The Netherlands, the laicistic republican policy of France and 
the much stronger bent towards ethnic assimilation in Switzerland, Austria 
and Germany? Or is it the case that people from Muslim cultures are the 
hardest religious-ethnic minorities to integrate in European societies because 
core elements of their current communities display the greatest distance 
towards the guiding principles of our liberal and secular social cultures? 
There are signs of evidence if you look at the cultural modernization that’s 
happened in our society in recent decades: gender equality, gay rights and 
the right to determine ones own sexuality, right to skepticism, irony and 
satire vis-à-vis religion in general, freedom to convert religious beliefs, and 
last but not least the condemnation of anti-Semitism.
These exemplary cultural achievements are protected under law. But it’s 
not enough just to respect the law when it comes to integration but to ac-
cept the core values of the immigrant community. Of course, the immigrants’ 
values are construed at an individual level in society but, as in all societies, 
it’s a question here of deep-rooted social dispositions which cannot be ‘un-
construed’ haphazardly or in a short timeframe. The offer of language and 
integration courses is a necessary but certainly far from sufficient condition. 
Immigrants have to engage actively in politics and societies.
At least just as important is swift integration into the labour market. Long 
waiting times for work permits are fatal. But integration into the labour 
market cannot undermine important regulations such as the minimum 
wage or job protection, including against dismissal. And it’s crystal clear 
that any such squaring of the circle can only involves painful compromises 
for social democratic policy. Neoliberal labour markets can absorb unskilled 
migrant labour easier than regulated markets. In the short term, one might 
be sceptical that such partial re-regulations can be won against any trade 
union veto – and the unions can, for their part, claim legitimate grounds 
for their positioning. Social democratic labour and welfare policies have to 
navigate between Scylla and Charybdis.
It will be even tougher to undertake that ‘deconstruction’ of deep-rooted pa-
triarchal and anti-Enlightenment value models that is essential for integration. 
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Anybody thinking in shortened timeframes does not want to understand 
how deeply ethno-religious values are rooted in an individual’s personality. 
It’s not improbable that parallel societies emerge that may well not run up 
against the constitutional decrees of the state but may still reflect patriarchal 
and illiberal traditions. But the parallel subcultural societies rarely engage 
in common organizations, projects and activities. The likely medium-term 
perspective is therefore neither the normatively unacceptable assimilation 
to a dominant culture nor a multi-cultural mishmash but the hopefully 
peaceful co-existence of segregated cultures. Such a realistic perspective 
does not negate the need for cultural integration but it does separate the 
diagnosis of what IS from an ever-valid perspective on what SHOULD BE.
3.  Discursive Engagement: 
cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism
There’s a third cleavage that’s starting to form in our societies in the wake 
of globalization: that between cosmopolitan elites – the sociologist Richard 
Sennett mocks these as frequent flyers – and the intellectually, geographi-
cally as well as socially immobile parts of our societies.
Three principles define the normative core of cosmopolitanism: individualism, 
universalism and openness. Cosmopolitans want open borders, open-door 
immigration, easier access to citizenship, cultural pluralism as well as global 
responsibility for universally valid human rights and environmental protection. 
Cosmopolitans play up the opportunities of globalization, communitarians 
its risks. The latter prefer communities built on solidarity, controlled borders, 
they stand for limits on immigration, opt for cultural identity and stress the 
value of social cohesion and engagement that is supposedly easier to maintain 
in small definable communities than in unbounded social spaces whose 
texture rapidly alters. A positive variant of communitarianism would be 
the social democratic “Folkhemmet” (people’s home) in Sweden or Denmark, 
a negative or chauvinist model today’s rampant right-wing populism. The 
first is a political project of solidaristic engagement, the latter is an ethnic 
exclusion of the immigrants and new citizens.
Cosmopolitan views are found above all among the educated middle 
classes. Many of them are the winners of globalization. They enjoy the 
human capital enabling them to cope with cultural differences and eco-
nomically forced geographical mobility. These are the social groups that 
social democracy has won over even more strongly since the 1970s. The 
lower half of society is less mobile and more critically disposed towards 
open borders, immigration, imposed mobility, multiculturalism and com-
petition in the least-qualified segment of the labour market. These are the 
losers of globalization and potential voters of right wing populist parties. 
And, of course, it’s not dicey to speculate that they bear the biggest brunt 
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of open borders within their local quarters as well as in daily and working 
life. They bear the costs of open borders most of all while the upper and 
parts of the middle classes profit from them.
These new cleavages have for some time grown into a dilemma for Euro-
pean social democrats: if they make concessions to one side they lose votes 
on the other. The decline in voter support over the past decade precisely 
reflects this dilemma. The influx of refugees and the so far uniquely cosmo-
politan policy of the federal government within Europe have served to 
deepen this dilemma. This is an even bigger challenge for the communitarian, 
conservatively positioned Christian Democrats. They wanted openness for 
the free exchange of economic goods and services, not for migrant cultures 
or the massive inflow of culturally ‘alien’ people of whom it’s impossible to 
say whether they will help or hinder the economy and the exchequer.
Despite all these difficulties, the contours of a social democratic narrative 
can be discerned in this integration debate: the widening socio-economic 
divide between winners and losers of globalization must be closed; a strong 
state shows itself not only as a reliable set of laws but also as a guarantor 
of social advancement and equal life chances for all; this holds true not 
least for refugees and immigrants; to help them integrate they need dis-
proportionate financial support, if necessary even with affirmative action. 
Those affirmative actions have to be extended to the lower third of our 
society. It would make our societies more just and resilient against right-wing 
populist temptations.
Initiatives to build bridges and stimulate engagements between ethnic 
communities, organizations and associations within civil society must be 
promoted from below. The immigrants and the majority within modern 
and just societies must change too. But there can be no negotiation of the 
rule of law and the cultural values of an open society. That’s as true for 
indigenous xenophobia on one side as it is for religious-based intolerance 
in many current Islamic utterances on the other.
